Job market papers

No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the U.S. Congress — with Nathanial Hilger and Nicholas Miller. NBER WP w23904. [Media: The Intercept; VoxEU (coming soon); The Hindu; Frontiers of Economic Research podcast (coming soon); Harper’s Magazine (coming soon)]

Abstract: Why do wars occur? We exploit a natural experiment to test the longstanding hypothesis that leaders declare war because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We test this moral hazard theory of conflict by compiling data on 9,210 children of 3,693 US legislators who served in the U.S. Congress during the four conscription-era wars of the 20th century: World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. We test for agency problems by comparing the voting behavior of legislators with draft-age sons versus draft-age daughters. We estimate that (i) having a draft-age son reduces legislator support for pro-conscription bills by 10-17%; (ii) support for conscription increases by a quarter as a legislator’s son crosses the upper age threshold; and (iii) legislators with draft-age sons are more likely to win reelection on average. These results are consistent with a political agency model in which voters update their beliefs about politicians’ motives when they make unpopular legislative decisions. Our findings provide new evidence that agency problems contribute to political violence, and that elected officials can be influenced by changing private incentives.

The Economic Origins of Conflict in Africa  with Marshall Burke. NBER WP w23056 [R&R, Journal of Political Economy]. [HiCN WP 242] [IGC blog post]


Abstract: We study the impact of plausibly exogenous shocks to world food prices on violence across the African continent using panel data at the level of a 0.5 degree grid cell. In food-producing cells, higher prices reduce conflict over the control of territory (what we call “factor conflict”) and increase conflict over the appropriation of surplus (“output conflict”). We argue that this difference arises because higher prices raise the opportunity cost of soldiering for producers, while simultaneously inducing net consumers to appropriate increasingly valuable surplus as their real wages fall. In food-consuming cells, higher prices increase both factor conflict and output conflict. We validate the cell-level finding on output conflict using geocoded survey data on interpersonal theft and violence against commercial farmers and traders. Ignoring the distinction between producer and consumer effects leads to attenuated estimates. Our findings help reconcile a growing but ambiguous literature on the economic roots of conflict.

Selected working papers and works in progress:

The Political Economy of Ethnic Identification in Africa (multiple projects)

Public Goods and the Salience of Local Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Teacher Absenteeism in Africa [submitted]

Foreign Aid Preferences and Perceptions in Donor Countries  – with Pedro Vicente and Daniel Kaufmann [R&R, Journal of Comparative Economics]

Barriers to Education for Girls in Sierra Leone – with coauthors at BRAC and GWU (baseline data collected)


Peer-Reviewed Publications

Democratic Accountability, Regulation, and Inward Investment Policy, Economics & Politics (2014), 26(2), pp. 263–284 — with Fergal McCann and Michael Dorsch

Abstract: We examine the effect of domestic political accountability on leaders’ strategies for attracting Foreign Direct Investment to less developed countries. We consider two policy areas: the tax burden imposed on firms and the regulatory environment in which they operate. We find that democratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lower tax rates to foreign investors, while autocratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lax regulation. This result is driven by the greater elasticity of the political survival function to environmental and labor regulations in more democratic countries. Analyses of firm-level survey data confirm our main theoretical conclusions.

The Illusory Leader: Natural Resources, Taxation and Accountability. Public Choice (2013), 154(3-4), pp. 285-313

Abstract: This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which natural resources can affect democracy. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The theory is corroborated using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents. Results are robust to a range of alternative specifications. A supplementary analysis reveals that, consistent with the two-period model proposed, the effects are more acute closer to national elections.

Policy Papers

The Political Economy of Direct Dividend Transfers in Resource-Rich Countries: A Theoretical Consideration – with Marcelo Giugale and Anand Rajaram (World Bank). Forthcoming: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series

DFID Support to Education in East Africa: Lessons from the Research Literature, CEGA, UC Berkeley